Alkasb: Journal of Islamic Economics
published by Islamic Economics Study Program, Faculty of Sharia and Islamic Economics, Universitas Annuqayah, Sumenep, Indonesia
Volume 4, Nomor 2, December 2025, 240-260
E-ISSN: 2963-3737, DOI: https://doi.org/10.59005/alkasb.v4i2.705, available online at https://journal.ua.ac.id/index.php/alkasb

Managing Funds, Building Trust: An Integrative Review of Fund Management Principles and Depositor Trust in Islamic Banks

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Received:	Revised:	Accepted:
June 21, 2025	November 24, 2025	November 30, 2025

Abstract

Islamic banks mobilize most of their funds on the basis of trust: depositors place money under wadiah *safekeeping or* mudharabah *investment contracts without the control rights enjoyed by shareholders. Yet research on depositor trust and research on Islamic bank fund management have developed largely in isolation. Marketing studies treat trust as an outcome of image, satisfaction, and Shariah compliance, while finance and governance studies analyze investment account holders, profit smoothing, and Shariah supervision without theorizing trust from the depositor's perspective. This article integrates the two streams. Using an integrative review of 35 scholarly, regulatory, and*

institutional sources, it identifies six fund management principles associated with depositor trust: Shariah conformity and governance, prudential liquidity and risk management, fair profit distribution, transparency and disclosure, protection of funds and data in digital channels, and competent and ethical human capital. Drawing on the integrative model of organizational trust and on agency theory, the review shows that these principles build trust through three mechanisms: assuring Shariah authenticity, reducing information asymmetry, and protecting depositors' principal and data. It also identifies a trust paradox in profit smoothing, which can stabilize confidence in the short term but undermine perceived integrity if it is not disclosed. The article contributes an integrative framework and five propositions for empirical testing, and it draws implications for Islamic banks, the Financial Services Authority (OJK), and the National Sharia Council (DSN-MUI) in Indonesia.

Keywords: *Islamic banking; fund management; depositor trust; investment account holders; Shariah governance; Indonesia*

Introduction

Trust is the foundation of any deposit-taking institution, but it carries a distinctive weight in Islamic banking. Depositors in Islamic banks entrust their funds under contracts that differ fundamentally from conventional deposits. Under *wadiah* (safekeeping), the bank holds funds on the depositor's behalf; under *mudharabah* (profit-sharing investment), the depositor becomes an investment account holder who shares in the bank's profits and, in principle, bears losses on the assets financed (Archer et al., 1998). In both cases, depositors must rely on the bank to manage their funds prudently, distribute returns fairly, and remain faithful to Shariah. In Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population, the stakes of this trust are considerable: Islamic banking assets reached IDR 967.33 trillion by June 2025, yet the sector still accounted for only 7.41% of national banking assets (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan [OJK], 2025).

Events in recent years have shown how quickly such trust can be tested. In May 2023, Bank Syariah Indonesia (BSI), the country's largest Islamic bank, experienced a disruption of its mobile banking and ATM services that began on 8 May; a ransomware group subsequently claimed to have stolen 1.5 terabytes of data, including the records of some 15 million customers and employees, while the bank insisted that customers' funds and data were safe (Janti, 2023). The episode

illustrates that depositor confidence depends not only on an institution's Shariah label but also on how it manages, protects, and accounts for the funds entrusted to it.

Research relevant to this problem is divided into two streams that rarely meet. The first, rooted in marketing, treats trust as an outcome of customer satisfaction, corporate image, and Shariah compliance. It shows, for example, that Muslim customers establish relationships with Islamic banks because they trust that these banks are Shariah compliant (Amin et al., 2013), and that Shariah compliance and transparency are positively associated with customer trust (Sulistiyo et al., 2020). In this stream, however, the bank's fund management practices remain largely a black box. The second stream, rooted in finance, accounting, and governance, examines the agency position of investment account holders, the displaced commercial risk that pushes banks to smooth returns, and the effectiveness of Shariah supervision (Archer et al., 1998; Safieddine, 2009; Archer & Karim, 2009; Mollah & Zaman, 2015). This stream analyzes fund management in detail but seldom theorizes how depositors perceive it. In Indonesia, a third body of work consists mainly of descriptive library studies that list challenges facing Islamic banks, such as human resources, digital risk, and low literacy, without connecting them to a theory of trust (Nasrullah & Harahap, 2020; Hidayah et al., 2024; Situmorang et al., 2024).

This article addresses the gap between these streams through an integrative review. It asks three questions. First, which fund management principles does the literature associate with depositor trust in Islamic banks? Second, through which mechanisms do these principles shape trust? Third, what tensions arise among them, and what do they imply for Islamic banks and regulators in Indonesia? To answer these questions, the review combines the integrative model of organizational trust (Mayer et al., 1995), which distinguishes the trustee's ability, benevolence, and integrity, with agency theory as applied to Islamic banks (Archer et al., 1998; Safieddine, 2009).

The article makes three contributions. First, it offers an integrative framework that links six fund management principles to the dimensions of trust and to the agency problems of Islamic bank depositors. Second, it identifies a trust paradox in profit smoothing, through which a practice designed to preserve depositor confidence may erode the perceived integrity on which that confidence ultimately rests. Third, it derives five propositions for empirical testing and translates the framework into implications for banks, the Financial Services Authority (OJK), and the National Sharia Council of the Indonesian Ulema Council (DSN-MUI).

Theoretical background

Fund management in Islamic banks

Fund management in a bank refers to the planning, mobilization, allocation, and control of funds in order to meet the competing requirements of liquidity, profitability, and solvency (Muhammad, 2020). Islamic banks share this intermediation function with conventional banks, channeling funds from surplus to deficit units, but they must perform it within the constraints of Shariah and without recourse to interest (Arifin, 2002). Their objective is therefore not only an acceptable return but also the development of financial services that are consistent with Islamic law (Arifin, 2002; Soenjoto, 2018).

On the liability side, Indonesian Islamic banks mobilize funds mainly through current accounts, savings, and time deposits structured as *wadiah* or *mudharabah*, as regulated by DSN-MUI fatwas on current accounts, savings, and deposits (DSN-MUI, 2000a, 2000b). The distinction matters for trust. *Wadiah* deposits are held in safekeeping and must be returned in full, with any bonus given at the bank's discretion. *Mudharabah* deposits, by contrast, entitle the holder to a pre-agreed share of profits, which may be calculated on a revenue-sharing or profit-sharing basis (DSN-MUI, 2000c), and expose the holder to the performance

of the assets financed. On the asset side, funds are allocated to productive assets such as profit-sharing (*mudharabah*, *musyarakah*), sale-based (*murabahah*), and lease-based (*ijarah*) financing, as well as Shariah-compliant securities, and to non-productive assets such as cash, benevolent loans (*qardh*), and fixed assets (Soenjoto, 2018). Balancing these categories determines both the bank's capacity to meet withdrawals and the returns available to depositors.

Trust: Ability, benevolence, and integrity

Mayer et al. (1995) define trust as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another, based on the expectation that the other will perform an action important to the trustor regardless of the trustor's ability to monitor or control it. Their integrative model identifies three characteristics of a trustee that shape perceived trustworthiness: ability, or the skills and competencies to perform in a specific domain; benevolence, or the extent to which the trustee is believed to want to do good to the trustor; and integrity, or adherence to a set of principles that the trustor finds acceptable. In relationship marketing, trust is a central mediating variable that underpins commitment and cooperation (Morgan & Hunt, 1994), and consumer trust in service providers is shaped both by the behavior of frontline employees and by management policies and practices, which in turn influence perceived value and loyalty (Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002).

The definition is particularly apt for Islamic bank depositors, whose vulnerability arises precisely from their limited ability to monitor how their funds are used. For Islamic banks, integrity has an additional referent: the principles that depositors find acceptable include those of Shariah. Trust in an Islamic bank therefore involves confidence not only that it will safeguard and grow one's funds but also that it will do so in a religiously legitimate manner (Amin et al., 2013).

Agency theory and investment account holders

Agency theory analyzes relationships in which a principal delegates decision-making authority to an agent whose interests may diverge from the

principal's, producing agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In Islamic banks, investment account holders occupy an unusual position. They provide funds on a profit-sharing basis and bear investment risk, yet unlike shareholders they have no voting rights and no representation on the board. Archer et al. (1998) analyze this situation in terms of agency theory and transaction cost economics, showing how the contractual position of investment account holders raises distinctive governance and accounting problems. Safieddine (2009) adds that the separation of investment account holders' funds from their control gives bank managers opportunities to extract benefits at their expense, so that agency theory requires adaptation in the Islamic banking context.

Read together, the two theories suggest a complementary relationship. Where depositors cannot monitor the agent directly, they must either rely on governance mechanisms that monitor on their behalf or extend trust. Fund management principles can therefore be understood as serving a dual function: they are governance devices that constrain the agent, and they are signals from which depositors infer the agent's ability, benevolence, and integrity.

Method

This study adopts an integrative literature review, a form of research that reviews, critiques, and synthesizes representative literature on a topic in an integrated way so that new frameworks and perspectives are generated (Torraco, 2005). Integrative reviews are appropriate when a topic has been addressed by distinct research communities using different methods, and when the aim is to combine perspectives rather than to aggregate effect sizes (Snyder, 2019). Both conditions apply to the relationship between fund management and depositor trust in Islamic banks.

The review proceeded in four stages. First, the problem was formulated as the relationship between Islamic bank fund management and depositor trust.

Second, sources were identified through searches of Google Scholar and publisher databases (Emerald Insight, ScienceDirect, and SpringerLink) using combinations of the terms "Islamic bank", "Islamic banking", "fund management", "investment account holders", "profit equalization reserve", "displaced commercial risk", "Shariah governance", "disclosure", "trust", and "depositor". The searches were complemented by backward citation tracking of key articles and by the regulatory repositories of OJK, DSN-MUI, and the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). Third, sources were included if they were peer-reviewed articles, scholarly books, or official regulations and standards, and if they addressed fund mobilization, fund allocation, profit distribution, governance, disclosure, or trust in Islamic banks. Foundational theoretical works were included regardless of date, while empirical and regulatory sources published between 1998 and 2025 were prioritized. Sources without scholarly or official status, such as blogs and unreferenced web content, were excluded, with the exception of one established news report used to document the BSI incident. Fourth, each included source was coded for the fund management practice it addressed, the mechanism through which that practice was linked to trust or depositor protection, the trust dimension implicated, and the institutional context. The codes were then synthesized thematically into principles, and the principles were integrated into a conceptual framework.

The final corpus comprised 35 sources, distributed across six streams of literature as shown in Table 1. Methodological references used to design the review are not counted in the corpus.

Table 1. Composition of the review corpus

Literature stream	n	Representative sources
Trust and relationship theory	3	Mayer et al. (1995); Morgan & Hunt (1994); Sirdeshmukh et al. (2002)
Agency and governance of Islamic banks	5	Jensen & Meckling (1976); Archer et al. (1998); Grais & Pellegrini (2006); Safieddine (2009); Mollah & Zaman (2015)
Fund mobilization, profit distribution, and risk	7	Chong & Liu (2009); Archer & Karim (2009); IFSB (2010); Khan (2010); Abedifar et al. (2013); Beck et al. (2013); Noor & Mohamed (2019)
Disclosure and ethical identity	2	Maali et al. (2006); Haniffa & Hudaib (2007)
Customer trust in Islamic banks	3	Amin et al. (2013); Sulistiyo et al. (2020); Situmorang et al. (2024)
Indonesian regulation, institutions, and practice	15	Laws No. 24/2004, 21/2008, and 27/2022; DSN-MUI fatwas (2000a, 2000b, 2000c); OJK (2023, 2025); Arifin (2002); Soenjoto (2018); Muhammad (2020); Nasrullah & Harahap (2020); Janti (2023); Hidayah et al. (2024)
Total	35	

Source: Authors' compilation.

Findings: Six fund management principles associated with depositor trust

The synthesis identified six principles. Each is presented below in terms of its core practices, the evidence linking it to trust or depositor protection, and its Indonesian institutional anchor. Table 2 summarizes the results.

Principle 1: Shariah conformity and Shariah governance

The first principle concerns the conformity of fund management with Shariah, both in contract design and in the governance arrangements that assure it. For Muslim customers, Shariah compliance is a primary basis of trust in Islamic banks (Amin et al., 2013), and Indonesian evidence shows that Shariah compliance has a positive and strong effect on customer trust (Sulistiyo et al., 2020). In Indonesia, the legal basis for this assurance is Law No. 21 of 2008 on Islamic Banking, which requires every Islamic bank to establish a Shariah Supervisory

Board, while the substantive rules for deposit and financing contracts are set by DSN-MUI fatwas (DSN-MUI, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c).

Governance arrangements, however, are only as credible as their operation. Grais and Pellegrini (2006) identify independence, confidentiality, competence, consistency, and disclosure as the key issues on which the credibility of Shariah supervision depends, and evidence from a cross-country sample suggests that Shariah supervisory boards are associated with better performance in Islamic banks when they perform their monitoring role effectively (Mollah & Zaman, 2015). The literature also warns of a credibility gap. Studies of Malaysian Islamic deposit rates found them closely linked to conventional interest rates (Chong & Liu, 2009), and broader critiques argue that Islamic banking practice has converged substantially with conventional banking in form and substance (Khan, 2010). Such findings matter for trust because they speak directly to integrity: depositors who perceive that Shariah conformity is merely nominal may withdraw the very confidence on which Islamic banks depend.

Principle 2: Prudential liquidity and risk management

The second principle concerns the prudent management of liquidity and risk, which signals the bank's ability to safeguard depositors' funds. Islamic banks must hold sufficient liquid assets to meet withdrawals while placing enough funds in productive financing to generate returns (Muhammad, 2020; Soenjoto, 2018). Their ability to do so is constrained by the limited availability of Shariah-compliant liquidity instruments, which makes prudent asset–liability management particularly important. Cross-country evidence suggests that Islamic banks can perform comparably to or better than conventional banks on several prudential dimensions: one large comparative study found that Islamic banks were better capitalized, had higher asset quality, and were less likely to disintermediate during crises (Beck et al., 2013), while another found that small Islamic banks,

particularly those that are leveraged or located in predominantly Muslim countries, have lower credit risk than conventional banks (Abedifar et al., 2013).

In Indonesia, depositor protection is reinforced by Law No. 24 of 2004 on the Indonesia Deposit Insurance Corporation (LPS), whose guarantee scheme extends to deposits in Islamic banks. Deposit insurance supplements trust in the individual bank with trust in the system, but it does not remove the need for prudent fund management. Rather, it raises the importance of communicating that funds are protected, particularly during periods of uncertainty.

Principle 3: Fair profit distribution and management of return expectations

The third principle concerns the fair distribution of returns to *mudharabah* depositors and the management of their expectations. It lies at the heart of the agency relationship between the bank and investment account holders. Because Islamic banks compete with conventional banks for deposits, they face displaced commercial risk: the pressure to pay investment account holders a return above what the underlying assets have earned in order to prevent withdrawals (Archer & Karim, 2009). To manage this pressure, banks may set aside a profit equalization reserve from gross income and an investment risk reserve from investment account holders' share of profits, drawing on these reserves to stabilize payouts across periods. The IFSB has issued guidance on the practice of smoothing profit payouts to investment account holders (IFSB, 2010), and empirical work on Malaysian Islamic banks has examined how the use of profit equalization reserves relates to earnings management, capital management, and profit distribution management (Noor & Mohamed, 2019).

From a trust perspective, smoothing is double-edged. It supports perceptions of ability and benevolence by sparing depositors volatile returns, and it reduces withdrawal risk. Yet it also obscures the risk-sharing character of *mudharabah*, transfers income between periods and between cohorts of depositors, and grants managers discretion that depositors cannot observe (Archer & Karim,

2009; Safieddine, 2009). If depositors later discover that the stable returns they received did not reflect actual performance, their perception of the bank's integrity may suffer. We refer to this tension as the trust paradox of profit smoothing.

Principle 4: Transparency and disclosure

The fourth principle concerns the transparency of fund management and the disclosure of information that allows depositors and their proxies to evaluate it. Transparency is the most direct remedy for the information asymmetry at the core of the agency problem, and Archer et al. (1998) emphasize the implications of investment account holders' position for accounting regulation and external auditing. Indonesian evidence shows that among the dimensions of good corporate governance, transparency was the only one with a significant positive effect on customer trust in an Islamic bank (Sulistiyo et al., 2020).

Empirical studies of disclosure practice, however, suggest that Islamic banks often communicate less than their ethical identity implies. A study of social reporting found that Islamic banks' disclosures fell well short of what an Islamic benchmark would expect (Maali et al., 2006), and an analysis of annual reports found substantial gaps between the ideal and the communicated ethical identity of Islamic banks (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2007). For depositor trust, the most relevant disclosures concern the allocation of funds by contract and sector, the method of calculating and distributing returns, the use of smoothing reserves, and the opinions of the Shariah Supervisory Board. Disclosure supports trust only if it is intelligible, which suggests that plain-language explanations of profit distribution are as important as formal compliance with reporting standards.

Principle 5: Protection of funds and data in digital channels

The fifth principle concerns the protection of depositors' funds and personal data as fund management moves into digital channels. Digitalization has expanded access to Islamic banking services but has also created new risks, including cyberattacks, fraud, and data leakage (Hidayah et al., 2024). The BSI

incident of May 2023 shows how a technological failure can become a trust crisis: services were disrupted for several days, the attackers claimed to have obtained the data of millions of customers, and the bank had to reassure depositors publicly that their funds and data were safe (Janti, 2023).

Indonesia's regulatory framework has responded to these risks. OJK Regulation No. 21 of 2023 on Digital Services by Commercial Banks, which replaced OJK Regulation No. 12/POJK.03/2018 and applies to both conventional and Islamic commercial banks, governs digital services, the use of information technology, customer protection, and personal data protection (OJK, 2023). Law No. 27 of 2022 on Personal Data Protection further defines the obligations of data controllers. In terms of trust, effective protection of funds and data signals ability, while transparent and responsive communication during incidents signals benevolence. Both are necessary, because a bank that is technically competent but uncommunicative during a crisis may still lose depositors' confidence.

Principle 6: Competent and ethical human capital

The sixth principle concerns the people who manage funds and interact with depositors. Fund management in Islamic banks requires expertise in both finance and Shariah, and the literature on Indonesian Islamic banking repeatedly identifies the shortage of personnel combining these competencies as a constraint on the industry's development (Nasrullah & Harahap, 2020; Hidayah et al., 2024). Frontline staff are also the face of the institution: they explain contracts, disclose risks, and handle complaints. Consumer trust is shaped by the competence and benevolence that frontline employees display as well as by management policies and practices (Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002), and the Indonesian literature emphasizes professionalism, integrity, and relationship-oriented service as foundations of public trust in Islamic banks (Situmorang et al., 2024). Human capital therefore underpins the other five principles, because it determines whether formal policies are implemented and communicated faithfully.

Table 2. Fund management principles, trust dimensions, and agency functions

Principle	Core practices	Trust dimension	Agency function	Indonesian anchor
1. Shariah conformity and governance	Shariah-compliant deposit and financing contracts; effective Shariah Supervisory Board; disclosure of Shariah opinions	Integrity	Monitoring by a delegated expert	Law 21/2008; DSN-MUI fatwas
2. Prudential liquidity and risk management	Asset–liability matching; adequate liquid assets; credit risk control; capital buffers	Ability	Bonding through prudential constraints	OJK prudential rules; LPS deposit guarantee (Law 24/2004)
3. Fair profit distribution	Transparent revenue- or profit-sharing ratios; disciplined and disclosed use of smoothing reserves	Integrity; benevolence	Alignment of returns with performance	DSN-MUI Fatwa 15/2000
4. Transparency and disclosure	Reporting of fund allocation, return calculation, reserves, and Shariah opinions in intelligible form	Integrity	Reduction of information asymmetry	OJK reporting requirements
5. Protection of funds and data	Cyber resilience; data protection; incident response and communication	Ability; benevolence	Protection of principals' assets	POJK 21/2023; Law 27/2022
6. Competent and ethical human capital	Dual financial and Shariah competence; ethical frontline conduct; complaint handling	Ability; benevolence; integrity	Agent quality and conduct	Industry training and certification

Source: Authors' synthesis.

Discussion

An integrative framework

Figure 1 integrates the findings into a conceptual framework. The six principles operate through three mechanisms. The first is the assurance of Shariah authenticity, which addresses the distinctive integrity concern of Islamic bank depositors and is delivered chiefly through Shariah conformity, Shariah

governance, and the disclosure of Shariah opinions. The second is the reduction of information asymmetry, which addresses the agency problem of investment account holders and is delivered chiefly through transparency, disclosure, and fair and explainable profit distribution. The third is the protection of principal and data, which addresses depositors' vulnerability to loss and is delivered chiefly through prudential risk management, deposit insurance, and digital security. Competent and ethical human capital supports all three mechanisms.



Figure 1. Integrative framework linking fund management principles to depositor trust in Islamic banks

Source: Authors' synthesis.

These mechanisms shape the three dimensions of perceived trustworthiness identified by Mayer et al. (1995), which together constitute depositor trust. Trust in turn supports deposit retention and loyalty (Amin et al., 2013; Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002). The framework also contains a feedback loop. A bank that enjoys high depositor trust faces less withdrawal pressure when returns fall, which reduces the displaced commercial risk that motivates profit smoothing in the first place. Trust built through transparency can therefore reduce the need for the opaque practices that threaten it.

Propositions for future research

The framework yields five propositions that can be tested empirically.

Proposition 1. Depositors' perceptions of Shariah conformity and of the effectiveness of Shariah governance are positively associated with their trust in an Islamic bank, primarily through perceived integrity.

Proposition 2. The disclosure of fund allocation and profit distribution methods in an intelligible form is positively associated with the trust of *mudharabah* depositors, and this association is stronger than for *wadiah* depositors.

Proposition 3. Undisclosed profit smoothing is associated with higher short-term deposit stability but, once discovered, with lower perceived integrity; disclosed smoothing does not carry this penalty.

Proposition 4. Following a digital security incident, the speed and transparency of a bank's communication moderate the negative effect of the incident on depositor trust.

Proposition 5. Perceived competence and benevolence of frontline staff strengthen the relationship between formal fund management policies and depositor trust.

Trade-offs and tensions

The principles do not always reinforce one another. The first and most important tension is the trust paradox of profit smoothing described above, in which a practice that protects confidence in the short term may undermine integrity in the long term. A second tension lies between prudence and competitiveness: holding more liquid assets protects depositors but lowers returns, which may intensify displaced commercial risk in a dual banking system. A third tension lies between digital convenience and security, since the channels that make Islamic banking more accessible also expose depositors to new risks. A fourth tension concerns the relationship between Shariah conformity and commercial convergence: the closer Islamic banks' products and returns come to

those of conventional banks, the easier they are to compare and adopt, but the harder it becomes to sustain the perception of a distinctive Islamic identity (Chong & Liu, 2009; Khan, 2010). Managing these tensions openly, rather than resolving them silently in favor of short-term stability, is itself a source of trust.

Implications for Indonesia

For Islamic banks, the framework suggests four priorities. First, banks should publish plain-language explanations of how returns to depositors are calculated, whether and how smoothing reserves are used, and how funds are allocated across contracts and sectors. Second, the opinions and activities of Shariah Supervisory Boards should be made visible to depositors, not only to regulators. Third, digital resilience and crisis communication should be treated as part of fund management, since the security of funds and data is now inseparable from their stewardship. Fourth, investment in personnel who combine financial and Shariah competence should be sustained, with particular attention to frontline staff who explain products to depositors.

For regulators, the framework points to the value of standardized disclosure requirements for *mudharabah* deposits, including the reporting of smoothing reserves, which OJK could develop within its roadmap for strengthening Islamic banking. DSN-MUI could complement such requirements with guidance on the Shariah limits of smoothing practices. Coordination with LPS on communicating deposit protection to Islamic bank customers would further strengthen system-level trust.

Conclusion

This article set out to connect two literatures that have developed in parallel: research on depositor trust in Islamic banks and research on how Islamic banks manage the funds entrusted to them. Through an integrative review of 35 sources, it identified six fund management principles associated with depositor

trust: Shariah conformity and governance, prudential liquidity and risk management, fair profit distribution, transparency and disclosure, protection of funds and data in digital channels, and competent and ethical human capital. Drawing on the integrative model of organizational trust and on agency theory, it showed that these principles shape trust through three mechanisms: assuring Shariah authenticity, reducing information asymmetry, and protecting depositors' principal and data.

The article makes three contributions. Theoretically, it links fund management practices to the dimensions of trust and to the agency position of Islamic bank depositors in a single framework. Conceptually, it identifies the trust paradox of profit smoothing and four broader tensions among fund management principles. Empirically, it provides five propositions that can guide future research. Practically, it translates the framework into priorities for Islamic banks, OJK, DSN-MUI, and LPS.

The review has limitations. It is an integrative rather than a systematic review, and although its search strategy and inclusion criteria are reported, its corpus is representative rather than exhaustive. It is limited to sources in English and Indonesian, and its Indonesian focus may limit the transferability of some implications to other jurisdictions. Most importantly, the framework and propositions are conceptual and require empirical validation. Future research could test the propositions with survey data from *wadiah* and *mudharabah* depositors, use experimental designs to examine how the disclosure of profit smoothing affects perceived integrity, and analyze deposit flows around trust shocks such as the 2023 BSI incident.

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